EXHIBIT 4

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CIVIL PART MERCER COUNTY

DOCKET NO. MER-L-000360-24 APP. DIV. NO. _____

CHAYA LORD and BRANDON

LORD,

Plaintiffs,

V.

UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., : RASIER, LLC, JUAN R. : ESCOBAR, JOHN DOES 1-10 : (fictitious designations),: MOTION HEARING

and ABC COMPANIES 1-10 (fictitious designations) :

Defendants. :

TRANSCRIPT OF

Place: Mercer County

Civil Courthouse (Heard via Zoom)

Date: July 9, 2025

BEFORE:

HONORABLE DOUGLAS H. HURD, P.J.Cv.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

BRUCE H. STERN, ESQ. (Stark & Stark, P.C.)

APPEARANCES:

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Colloquy / Argument

(Proceedings commenced at 3:06 p.m.)
THE COURT: Good afternoon, Counsel. We are on the record here. This is docket 360-24. Can you state your appearances, please?

MR. STERN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Bruce Stern, the law firm of Stark and Stark on behalf of the plaintiffs, and let me introduce Your Honor to Mr. Stanley, who's also my co-counsel.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. CARTON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Chris Carton from Bowman and Brooke for defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. and Rasier, LLC.

THE COURT: Very good. And who are we missing here?

MR. STERN: Mr. Kessler.

THE COURT: Okay. So he's -- let me just

see. Which motion is he on?

MR. STERN: He was on the neuropsychological motion.

THE COURT: All right. So why don't we move on with the other ones, then? Why don't we start with the Motion for Reconsideration, if that's okay? So Mr. Carton, this is your motion. You can go ahead.

MR. CARTON: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor. And this relates, Your Honor, as you recall, to the

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depositions of two -- two pers -- two matters, one person, Erin O'Keefe, and -- and the specific company witnesses in -- in two -- two separate matters.

Your Honor's instincts originally when we argued this were correct, I believe, and I think the papers have since borne this out in that there's something inherently wrong and you -- the Court does not have the power to just enter an order producing documents that have protected in orders of -- protective orders, confidentiality orders, entered by other courts in other jurisdictions.

And -- and as Your Honor knows, those protective orders are not just done ever at the request of one party; they are always done either joint -- jointly or court-ordered by a court and they can be requested by a plaintiff or they can be requested by a defendant. And when things are marked confidential, particularly depositions, that's not just to protect a defendant and its documents, it's oftentimes a lot to do with the person being deposed or the aspects of the plaintiff in the lawsuit.

So it's a -- the simple issue is whether or not depositions that were subject to protective orders are subject to production. Your Honor originally said no and then on some -- on reconsideration by Mr. Stern,

based upon some of the actions stayed in the MVL court but that are not Third-Circuit that are not New Jersey law, Your Honor found that that -- you were presented with evidence to suggest it -- it can be done.

And so we've moved for reconsideration, Your Honor, specifically now directing the Court to what we think is more apt case law and precedent, precedent meaning specifically New Jersey Supreme Court in the Hammock by Hammock decision, but -- that's been cited favorably and then up in the Third Circuit, which is the district in which we sit. And I know that that's not binding and -- on Your Honor. However, they -- the Court there is, in the cases we've cited, applying New Jersey law and even remarking that -- that they believe this is how it would be done in -- in New Jersey, basically.

And the cases which are the Third Circuit Court of Appeals District of New Jersey, District of Delaware, and -- and the New Jersey Supreme Court, as I mentioned, basically say that when you're -- the procedure, the proper procedure to effect a protective order entered by a different court is for the person that wants to upset that protective order or receive those materials to intervene or to make an application

Argument

to the Court that issued the protective order and have it evaluated under the context of the case in which it was issued and have a decision made, but not to come to a collateral court such as Your Honor's and ask Your Honor to effect an order.

Now, plaintiff has argued that this isn't upsetting or this isn't -- this isn't in any way mo -seeking to modify a protective order, but it absolutely is, Your Honor. If a deposition's marked confidentiality -- confidential pursuant to a protective order in a separate matter in some other court and Mr. Stern and his client would like to upset that -- they want to receive that document and they're not parties that have received it from parties in that case, if you'll recall here, Mr. Stern recounted that he went to Kline and Specter for the Sauerwein deposition and they told him they can't produce it, it's subject to a protective order, we can't give it to you.

So the procedure, Your Honor, is to -- that is modification of a protective order. what's being asked here is that documents that were marked "confidential" pursuant to a protective order be produced. And the question is whether Your Honor has the authority to produce it or the court that entered

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Argument

the protective order. And the case law that's relevant from the Third Circuit interpreting New Jersey law and from the New Jersey Supreme Court suggest that the —filing a motion to intervene in the court that issued the protective order, that's the proper procedure to seek to alter it. It is alteration of a protective order because you are carving a document out that was protected and producing it to strangers in a different, unrelated litigation.

And so, Your Honor, I'm happy to discuss the cases but they were specifically the <u>Dart Industries</u> matter from the District of Delaware, 1970; the Pano -- <u>Patopaque Products Liability Litigation</u> from the District of New Jersey, 1995; <u>Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp</u>, District of Delaware, 2009; <u>Pansy v Stroudsburg</u>, that's the Third Circuit 1994; and the <u>Hammock</u> decision I mentioned, Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1995.

So in light of that case law, Your Honor, which I just will say again, it — it actually jives with Your Honor's original instincts completely and suggests that the proper way, if they would like protected orders of Erin O'Keefe's depositions or the depositions of the company representatives in the two other matters, it's to proceed to those courts and

Argument

either ask the parties to sign the inter -- the protective order to voluntarily permit or to go to the court itself.

But respectfully, Your Honor, we believe that this -- this case law does indicate that this Court, respectfully, does not have the power and should not, on the basis of comity and for a lot of other reasons, order the, basically, modification of a protective order to produce those documents. So that's why we sought reconsideration. Just on the standard, Your Honor, there's something -- the standard -- right? This always happens. When you want reconsideration, you say a court can reconsider interlocutory orders whenever they want. When you don't, you cite the thing that says you have 20 days to do it. We all know that game. Here, we're talking about an interlocutory order. Your Honor absolutely has the power, for good cause, to reconsider.

And the only final thing I'll add, Your Honor, is just to remind this Court, we gave the plaintiffs every single deposition that Erin O'Keefe has done in New Jersey: seven. As a corporate representative, is -- under which every single one, the issues of "control" that are allegedly the issue in this case are -- are discussed and addressed. The two

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ex -- the proportionality aspects to expand beyond that alone mitigate against giving those. But the proper procedure is for plaintiffs to either voluntarily have those parties modify the protective orders or seek it from the courts themselves.

THE COURT: Thank -- thank you, Mr. Carton. Mr. Stern or Mr. Stanley?

MR. STERN: Thank you, Your Honor. I think in looking at this -- this motion, one has to first step back. And that is, we've requested the depositions of Erin O'Keefe, Peter Sauerwein and in the moving papers, I've called them the corporate representative or corporate designee in the Razak matter. It's now my understanding that the corporate representatives in Razak were a Mr. Rosenthal and a Mr. Baker.

But the first step is they argue well, they're covered by a protective order, yet they've never provided Your Honor with a protective order. Not one. I've invited them to produce a protective order multiple times and they, I guess for strategic reasons, haven't produced any. So before one can say hey, can I be compelled to produce a deposition transcript that's covered by a protective order, Your Honor needs to see the protective order.

Argument

I have attached three protective orders in our moving papers and reply brief. One of them is in Razak. In Razak, the order specifically states that the party whose documents are being sought continues to have control over those -- those documents.

So Uber has control of its own corporate designee transcript. In the <u>Robertson</u> case where I'd requested a copy of Mr. Sauerwein's deposition, I previously indicated that I believed that there was a protective order in that case. I did initially, way back, reach out to Ms. Lawless from Kline and Specter asking for a copy of Peter Sauerwein's deposition transcript. She said she could not send it to me because there was a confidentiality agreement, which I presumed meant there was a protective order.

I have -- my partner and I, Joe Cullen, independently have gone through the -- I'll call it efiling in the City of Philadelphia. There is no protective order on the court's website for the entry of a protective order in the <u>Robertson</u> case. I'm going to have to therefore assume that there's only a confidentiality agreement between Kline and Specter and Uber's counsel in that case, which is not Bowman and Brooke. But there is no protective order that I could find. And I -- I said Mr. Cullen and I both

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independently went through that. And I presumed, in response, if there was a protective order, then Mr. Carton would have supplied it.

Third, Your Honor, I've supplied Your Honor with -- as I said, with a number of -- protective orders, I think two of them, and previously -- submitted the MDL protective order. All three of them give Uber control of its own documents. So the protective orders do not bar Uber from turning over its own corporate designee transcripts.

THE COURT: And -- and I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I mean, in <u>Razak</u>, you know, which Mr. Carton cites to that the language that says all confidential information obtained by any person shall be maintained carefully so as to preclude access by persons who are not entitled to receive such information.

MR. STERN: I'll find your paragraph, Your Honor.

(Brief pause/dead air.)

MR. STERN: So if you go to -- I'll get the -- on this one order. This is in --

THE COURT: -- paragraph 5 in the <u>Razak</u>? MR. STERN: Yeah. This is in <u>Razak</u>,

paragraph under number 3, designation. It says, "Nothing contained in this stipulation shall affect the

Argument

right of a party to use or disclose information that such a -- that such a party has designated confidential as such party sees fit." It's Uber that wants it to be confidential, number one. So they have the authority to do as they want with their own documents that have been marked "confidential". And for Mr. Carton to suggest that there's some reason why a plaintiff would want Uber's corporate designee to be marked as confidential just doesn't bear credibility.

And I have Mr. Stanley here, who is involved in the \underline{Razak} case if there's any question as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of that remark.

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I -- I'm just -- I mean, it says here as well, other than at a trial or deposition related to this proceeding, court filing or hearing or conference regarding any motion in this proceeding, confidential information may not be disclosed or made available by a recipient of such information.

MR. STANLEY: Judge, if I may, may I make a comment here? This is Bret Stanley, Johnson Law Group. Every protective order that -- that I've ever been involved in with Uber, including the Razak matter, other protective orders and arbitrations that I've tried and the protective order in MDL all have some

portion in it that allows for production pursuant to court order. And -- and the <u>Razak</u> matter does at the bottom of page 10. If a receiving party is served at any time during or after the pendency of this matter, a subpoena or court order seeking disclosure of information produced in the proceeding, the receiving party shall immediately notify the producing party.

And so it contemplates production pursuant to court order, such that if you order or have ordered these productions, it's on the onus to notify the producing party, give them the option to come to you. But it — it contemplates productions can occur and do occur subject to protective orders. Indeed, in MDL, 3084, we were ordered, I was ordered to produce documents that I had obtained previously subject to a subpoena and court order in that — in that litigation for efficiency's sake. And Uber came to those hearings and understood that they argued against that and the judge says well, the protective order itself contemplates production if a court order comes into play.

THE COURT: That's -- I mean, is that the court order of the court that entered the protective order?

MR. STANLEY: So they sought protection from

Argument

a different court, actually, from -- from the -- well, in -- in MDL 3084, they sought protection because that request was made to that judge. And so it was a little different procedurally as you say. They didn't go back to prior arbitration and certainly didn't go back to Judge Baylson in the (indiscernible) of Pennsylvania to get permission for production.

MR. STERN: The second, Your Honor, is we attached a protective order, and I believe it's the <u>Golightly</u> case. There, there was a sharing agreement in which it specifically contemplated that counsels could share the protected documents with outside counsel as long as outside counsel was willing to sign the protective or -- you know, agreed that they would be covered by the protective order.

And also, we cited Your Honor to a third decision. Again, similarly, I believe it's the <u>Cortijo</u> case, which again indicated that the -- any documents that were marked confidential belonged to the party that marked them. That's -- <u>Cortijo</u> case that had the sharing agreement in <u>Golightly</u>. There was the discussion with regard to if it was your documents that were marked confidential, you had the ability to -- to turn them over. That would be paragraph 10 in <u>Golightly</u> on page 4 of the case text. It said, first,

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nothing contained in this protective order will affect or restrict the rights of any person with respect to its own documents or information produced in this action.

And then again, nothing in this protective order will prevent any person subject to it from producing any confidential discovery material in its possession in response to a lawful subpoena or other compulsory process or if required to produce by law or by any government agency having jurisdiction.

So we've produced to Your Honor multiple protective orders which permit Uber to provide these documents to us. Uber has, as has -- has been in the case in every motion, has never produced one certification or one explanation from Uber as to why it could.

The other thing I would just like to highlight, Your Honor, is Mr. Carton is fond of discussion and arguing proportionality, and I just want to remind the Court that New Jersey's Rule 4:10-2(g), which is the proportionality part of our rules, is much narrower than the federal rule. And the Court when considering proportionality is to look at the importance of the issues, the relevancy of the discovery, the amount in controversy, and each party's

Decision

resources.

And obviously it's important to us in terms of savings that Uber has made in the past with regard to control. It's certainly relevant. Thi -- my client sustained a significant traumatic brain injury in this crash, and -- and we can't -- no one can argue that Uber doesn't have the resources; they're a \$58 billion international corporation. So Mr. Carton's fond of arguing proportionality, but when we're talking about proportionality, we have to look at the four factors and see how and whether they actually apply and -- and how they fall, plaintiff versus defendant.

I mean, just let me ask. THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, isn't it -- under the cases cited by Mr. Carton, isn't it appropriate, though, for you to go back to those courts that actually entered those orders?

MR. STERN: Well, many of those decisions cited by Mr. Carton, I think almost all of them, including Hammock, have to do with public interest groups looking to obtain information, not by plaintiff's counsel or defendant's counsel seeking transcripts. And we've supplied Your Honor with decisions from other courts, that specifically bold that the Court has the power to order, which is why

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Your Honor granted my motion for reconsideration. THE COURT: Okay. Well, listen. I mean, you know, I -- I hate to go back and forth on this, but I do agree with Mr. Carton. I mean, I -- I've, you know, two or three times now gone through every case that was -- was cited to me. Mr. Carton is correct. My initial instincts when I didn't have all these cases was correct. And, you know, I understand your position, Mr. Stern, and I -- you know, I apologize for kind of switching back and forth here, but under the Lawson case, the Court does have the ability in the interest of justice, to reconsider an interlocutory like -order like this.

So, you know, when you read these cases, and of course, they're distinguishable on the facts and for various procedural reasons, but when you read the language of these cases, <u>Inventio</u>, I'm not pronouncing these -- Panotoco (sic), I have the IBM case. And the IBM case was Second Circuit case where the Second Circuit reversed the trial court for -- for, you know, agreeing to release this information. The Pansy case, that's a Third Circuit case, <u>DVL</u>, District of New The <u>Harper</u> case, which is the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. You know, the courts are clear that if I was to or -- it would offend notions of comity.

Decision / Colloquy

And that the appropriate avenue is to make application to those courts that have entered those orders or have considered their confidential information as part of an agreement between counsel to seek relief there.

So, you know, I -- I understand, you know, I -- it's a unique issues that's -- that's new to me here, which is why I -- I've kind of -- kind of gone back and forth on this and I apologize for that, but having read these cases and read them multiple times, it's the unmistakable conclusion that Mr. Carton is correct on this. So I'll -- I'll enter his order --

MR. STERN: Your Honor, if I could just inquire as to Mr. Sauerwein's deposition, because there is no protective order in that case. So there's not an issue of you -- of Your Honor overruling or some other court having entered an order.

THE COURT: Mr. Carton, do you want to address that?

MR. CARTON: Yeah. Just the -- I need to confirm that, Your Honor, that there is not. I know it's not reflective of the record on this motion, but if there is, I would ask that it be subject to the Court's order. And if not, Your Honor, and if Your Honor's inclined to produce it, I would ask that it

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only be done so a protective -- once a protective order is entered in this case.

If you recall, Your Honor had -- even your order producing these depositions before this reconsideration motion provided it's subject to a protective order in this case, and there's still not We've -- we've provided counsel with a basic -- a basic protective order, just like the one we were just looking at a moment ago, that's pretty -- pretty common, but counsel refused to sign it because he -- my understanding is he would only agree to protect and allow us to mark confidential these depositions and not documents like you do in the cases like this; when you produce information, it's up to the party to decide what's confidential, what's not. There's a dispute process and protective order if counsel feels that something's marked improperly.

So I would -- so I'd like to confirm there's no protective order in that case, Your Honor, and if there is, that it be subject to Your Honor's order. not, I'd like that it be conditioned upon a protective order in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess we -- we don't have the answer is the point. If -- if it is subject to a confidential protective order, then

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obviously it would be subject to the decision I just But, you know, if not, I -- and Mr. Carton, are you referring to my April 3rd order?

MR. CARTON: No. Your -- your reconsideration -- your May -- I think it was May 9 -the second -- the May 9 order, Your Honor, or May --THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CARTON: When Your Honor did order these produced based on Mr. Stern's --

MR. STERN: Just let me clarify, Your Honor. When Your Honor granted my motion for reconsideration and said that the transcripts would be produced pursuant to a protective order, that was fine. Mr. Carton and Mr. Meyer -- I think it was Mr. Meyer that sent it to me, I don't know who prepared it, but that -- what they sent me went well above and beyond a protective -- Your Honor ordered a protective order on the transcripts. They wanted to enter an order making everything confidential, and I said no, draft a protective order pursuant to the Court's ruling and I'll sign it. They never did.

> THE COURT: Okay. Yeah.

MR. STERN: I know that's not in front of you, but I just want the record to be clear. Okay. I -- I understand your THE COURT:

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point. So Mr. Carton, then, I mean, if -- I guess -- I mean, if you're saying -- I mean, I don't know. This -- this issue of Mr. Sauerwein isn't in front of me because the April 3rd order that all this started from was -- that was Ms. O'Keefe. Part -- part of that was Ms. O'Keefe, but then deposition transcripts subject to confidentiality agreements or protective orders do not have to be produced. So --

MR. CARTON: Right. It was the May 9th order, Your Honor. The next one, when Mr. Stern moved for reconsideration and Your Honor ordered -- it was pursuant to a protective order in that time. And I think Your Honor -- I think in oral argument, actually, last time believed one was in place, but if we look at that -- I was looking at that transcript yesterday. And in fact, they're just not, Your Honor. So --

THE COURT: Well, I --

MR. CARTON: -- clearly. And so I'd ask this, that we -- Your Honor's order -- if Sauerwein's not subject to a protective order in that Robertson case, I would just ask that it simply says it must be produced purs -- you know, upon execution of a protective order in this case. And we'll hopefully do that by consent, Your Honor, or hopefully maybe the Court -- we could put one to the Court. I mean, ARBIS

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did not deviate very much from the one that's in the appendix of the court rules.

THE COURT: Just one second. So the order you submitted with this motion says the defendant's motion for reconsideration is granted. The May 9 order is vacated. Okay? So that's what you submitted with this motion that we -- I just decided. So by vacating the May 9th order, that means that the April 3rd is now the operative order. Understand? Okay. So the April 3rd order, you know, just mentioned that Ms. O'Keefe's deposition transcript had to be produced, and then that any deposition transcripts subject to confidentiality agreements or protective orders do not have to be So I -- you know, so -- so what happens is produced. the April 3rd order doesn't reference the condition of any production to a confidentiality order or protective order, unless I missed --

MR. STERN: Your Honor, if -- I'm more than happy, if you'll give -- if Mr. Carton will give me Mr. Sauerwein's transcript, it can -- it will be subject to the same -- it will be subject to confidentiality. I don't have a problem with that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STERN: I'm just not going to sign a blanket --

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MR. CARTON: Okay. If we -- as long as -- as long as Your Honor, there is some situation where even if we come to just terms with Mr. Stern on that deposition, that that be confidential, that's fine. We'll work that out. I just -- I just don't want the order to say we've got to launch it tomorrow if -- without anything in place at all.

THE COURT: Yeah. Like I said, your -- your order just vacates the May 9th order, which means the April 3rd order goes back into effect. Okay. So -- MR. STERN: Judge, that takes me to my motion.

THE COURT: Correct. Correct.

MR. STERN: So Your Honor ordered them to produce the O'Keefe April 3rd and here we are July 9th and I still don't have any of them.

THE COURT: Okay. So -- I mean, that -- the order says Uber/Rasier has 30 days from this date to make inquiry regarding the production of copies of all of Erin O'Keefe's deposition transcripts, regardless of whether they were taken in New Jersey or other states. So what -- what's the status of that, Mr. Carton?

MR. CARTON: Your Honor, the -- the -- there are dozens of depositions of Erin O'Keefe. The process -- what's held up the process is trying to determine

Colloquy

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which of those -- individual action because it requires an actual individual contact with the parties to see whether or not they were -- there was a protective order in the case and whether the deposition made it to, you know, to be a -- a protective order.

So what the -- the -- the order -- the April order did not require production of the depositions, it was the inquiry and where we're at is that there are literally dozens and we're trying to weed through which ones are protected and which ones were not. mean, if we could -- I'm trying to think if there's a way, Your Honor, we could mutually sort of somehow -if we could put a number on it and we could find -- you know, find the ones that are -- so we're not looking through, you know, dozens and dozens to try to -- this process is taking a massive amount of work and time to just try to figure out which ones are -- are subject to or not subject to a protective order. If there could be some limit or something that would -- we could either agree with Mr. Stern on. I mean, -- got seven in New Jersey. We need dozens more for the purposes of this case, this Lord case. So --

THE COURT: Mr. Stern, what are your

thoughts?

MR. STERN: Well, I don't know how many

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transcripts there are out there, number one. All I know is we argued this motion. Your Honor entered an order. You gave over 30 days. Now we're 90 days and they haven't complied with your Court's order. That's all I know. That -- they were given 30 days prior, Your Honor, to do what Mr. Carton's now asking.

At least as I read the protective orders, transcripts are supposed to be marked "Confidential". So it's not that difficult to open up a PDF and see whether it says "Confidential" or not.

THE COURT: I mean, I'm not sure that -- Mr. Carton, I mean, there's no doubt you're not in compliance with the order, but -- I mean, do you have an idea how much longer it's going to take, or --

MR. CARTON: I would just ask for the -- that 30-day, Your Honor. With the reconsideration and everything changing, it -- it just changed the -- the landscape. If we could just go back to the April 3rd and now say 30 days, I would request that the Court respectfully do that.

THE COURT: Thirty days -- an additional 30 days to make inquiry?

MR. CARTON: To give Mr. Stern a number of how many would -- there would be. Right. And then we hopefully could work out some agreement on, you know,

Colloquy

maybe -- if the case is in some -- if it's just O'Keefe, it could be a case about anything. So hopefully -- I'm hopeful that as a sub-process, we could sort of talk and agree these are the -- bases in which somebody was actually in -- an injury-type case. So yeah, 30 days for the inquiry and then we can

hopefully have the number -- number generated and then we can hopefully come to some agreement on what -- what the actual ones Mr. Stern would like.

Mr. Stern, any thoughts?

And then when I served this most recent

THE COURT:

MR. STERN: I'm all right with most of that. My -- my big concern is, you know, Mr. Carton keeps going well, he -- he gave me seven. I think of the seven, four or five of the seven were so inaccurate that they barely even scratched the surface. You know, one of the things as I've said to Your Honor, and I've said this before, is you don't know what you don't So if you're deposing somebody from Uber and you don't know the documents exist, if you don't know that they have -- what the algorithms are -- you know, just to give you an example here, they turned over initially only documents with regard to the rides that Mr. Escobar gave in 2022. I did have checkered background

searches that they provided, but I didn't know what

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they meant.

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Notice to Produce, all of a sudden, I find out that Mr. Escobar had been suspended by Uber, had been -- when he reapplied, he had been rejected once by Uber. So if you don't have the documents, the point being you can't take a good deposition. So they say seven that they gave me, five were -- only two were -- were good and those were the ones taken by my partner, so.

THE COURT: All right. Well --

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ STERN: I'm happy to try to resolve the issue with Mr. Carton.

THE COURT: Okay. I would agree.

MR. STERN: -- we're going to move on it.

THE COURT: Yeah. No. I -- you -- you've been patient and, you know, Mr. Carton, this 30 days has to be complied with. Okay? I mean --

MR. CARTON: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. I'm not sure why it's taking so long. So what I'll do is -- you know, I won't award sanctions, but I will say that the April 3rd order is modified to allow for an additional 30 days for the inquiry. Okay?

MR. CARTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. STERN: We do have Mr. Kessler here, Your

Honor.

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Argument

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THE COURT: Oh. He is?

MR. KESSLER: Yeah. I

MR. KESSLER: Yeah. I -- I apologize, everybody. I've been without power for about an hour and a half now. It's about 92 degrees, so I -- I apologize for that.

THE COURT: Okay. No problem. Okay. Why -- why don't we deal with, then, the motion dealing with Dr. Benoff? Mr. Stern, you can go ahead.

MR. STERN: Yes, Your Honor. I quite frankly expected more opposition. If I'd known what the opposition was going to be, my brief would have been There seems to be a disconnect between much shorter. Mr. Kessler and myself, because he talks about attorney work product. I'm not looking for any notes between Dr. Benoff and Mr. Kessler. Right? That would be protected. When I referenced "notes", normally when a neuro-psychologist or his or her technician administers testing, they take notes talking about the emotions of the testee, reactions, do they appear tired; just general comments that -- especially because Dr. Benoff doesn't -- it's my understanding does not administer So notes from his technician to him the tests. regarding the tests would be helpful.

But again, like, even though he didn't raise it, what -- as I said in my moving papers is they

raised the same argument with regard to the raw data as defense and neuro-psychologist raised in <u>DiFiore</u>. It's the same issue. They allege oh, you know, it's all protect -- and I entered into a protective order with Mr. Kessler with regard to video recording of Dr. Benoff's exam and I'm willing to enter into the same protective order with regard to the raw data. That's really all I have to say. My brief is pretty extensive.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Kessler, you can go ahead.

MR. KESSLER: Yeah, Judge. I -- you know, there may have been a time where -- discovery tools that are available to him to make a request and I have -- objection to it. I -- I don't know. It doesn't exist yet. So, you know, whatever it is that he's requesting, I mean (indiscernible) filing a Motion to Compel about (indiscernible). Once this -- once the examination is conducted, and Bruce and I have had cases with Dr. Benoff before. It's not usually an issue. We usually come to an agreement (indiscernible).

Once -- once this exam takes place and once Dr. Benoff utilizes whatever tools, you know, he wants to utilize, you know, and then, you know, if that's a

Argument

proper discovery (indiscernible), then I can respond to the proper discover. I'm -- I'm really only responding to a Motion to Compel (indiscernible) items to compel at this point. If it's not produced, it doesn't exist, it's not in existence. And there's no, you know, direct discovery demands to make.

You know, that -- that said, I think -- issue is now. If Bruce wants to reiterate these requests, I guess we'll call them requests, once the deposition -- once this IME goes forward, I mean, I -- then I can address it. I don't know what's (indiscernible). What Bruce says is right; there's commonly notes (indiscernible), particularly the other side. I need to see what is actually created before I can really respond substantively, and -- and so, you know, if -- if we want to follow the proper channels, then we -- you know, that's what we should do.

I -- I think this is premature and to compel him to produce stuff that's not in existence within a certain date when, you know, when we've not violated any discovery requirements up to this point, I don't think there's really (indiscernible) for that.

MR. STERN: Your Honor, Mr. Kessler has requested a neuro-psych evaluation. My client's -- I think it's scheduled for later this month. When she's

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examined, she's going to be given tests and she's going to give answers. Those answers are the raw data. So it's not like I'm asking her something that's not going to be existing; it's going to exist. I've been through this with Dr. Benoff and his partner, Dr. Masur, multiple times. They're go -- there's raw data that's going to be created. It's like saying plaintiff's going for a defense MRI and I'm saying well, I just want you to send me the MRI once the test is done. Dr. Benoff will score that test. They -- he has a form called a Scoring Summary Sheet. I want that sheet.

He gives the MMPI. It's a 300 and some true/false questionnaire. I believe he scores it by hand. Some people send it to Puritan to have it scored electronically. In the event that it's -- that's what Dr. Benoff does, that's what I want. Dr. Benoff knows exactly what I'm re -- what I'm requesting.

Whether I take now -- I filed these motions now because normally, I'm like, if you're not going to give it to me, I'm not producing my client because the clock ticks on discovery. If I get Dr. Benoff's report, then I request the same thing I'm requesting now, now we're another month down the road and then we're two or three more -- because once I have the raw data, I'm going to hire experts to bar him and it's

Argument

just going to push the time. So the sooner I get these documents, the faster we can process this.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Kessler? Yeah, Judge. I -- I have no --MR. KESSLER: I understand why he wants stuff that -- he -apparently, he goes to Dr. Benoff (indiscernible). Right? But -- but it hasn't happened yet, so to -- to jump the line -- discovery demands -- and you know, quite frankly, look. It -- when proper discovery demands do come out, I'm -- I may accept that. (indiscernible) relies on AI MRIs that haven't -they're not -- there's no possible way for people to -to review (indiscernible). So -- it's a little bit odd that, you know, this is -- that I'm getting here when -- when I make the request of Dr. Greenwald (phonetic), the response is going to be well, we -- we can't get access to that.

But I'm -- I'm -- you know, I'm putting that cart before the horse because that's not -- the question here is can the -- can this person be compelled to produce something that doesn't exist now without any discovery demand being made? And -- and I think the answer is -- is no. Like, how could that possibly be?

So if there's a bigger question to address,

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then we can address that at the appropriate time, like when I violate a discovery demand, but there is no discovery demand made. You know, I -- I don't know, you know, perhaps Dr. Benoff's methods have changed. -- I don't (indiscernible) right to review what my expert has and produce it in -- in accordance with discovery demands. This is -- this is (indiscernible). MR. STERN: Well, I did request it and you said no.

MR. KESSLER: What exact date was this? MR. STERN: Well, you put in the -- in your protective order with regard to the video that I couldn't have the -- the raw data. I said I'm not signing that portion.

MR. KESSLER: No. We (indiscernible) a protective order that you said change this word to this and sent back, and we just sent it to you about 10 minutes ago. (Indiscernible) or we can address that, but you never raised any issue with my (indiscernible).

MR. STERN: Well, I did on the original one, but be that as it may, I mean, it makes no sense, Judge, for my client to get deposed -- I mean, dete -examined in two or three weeks and I make the same request I'm making now, I'm filing the same motion, and we're back in front of Your Honor.

Argument

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THE COURT: But I -- I mean -- I mean, this is a bit unusual, but -- you know, I'm -- I'm just trying to wrap my head around it. So I mean, it says in your papers that the examination is July 14th, so, you know, that's just -- just next week. But, I mean, you know, so after the examination, then, you know, this information will be created: the raw data, scoring summer sheet -- summary sheet, office notes. Stern, you could make a request and Mr. Kessler would Right? then review it. I mean, isn't -- isn't that the normal course? Like, why -- why would I order something to be produced that hasn't been complied with yet?

MR. STERN: Your Honor, I've requested it in They haven't agreed to provide it to me when advance. it's created, so I filed a motion so that once it's done, I get it.

THE COURT: No. I -- I can understand that, but I guess I understand Mr. Kessler's viewpoint, too, that shouldn't he have a chance to look at whatever's created --

MR. STERN: He can't look at it. That's the whole -- that's the whole point of this, is Dr. Benoff's -- argument is lawyers aren't allowed to have the raw data. So Dr. Benoff is not going to give it to

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Mr. Kessler voluntarily, either.

MR. KESSLER: Judge, I don't -- I don't think -- I don't think Mr. Stern can really -- can make that representation to the Court. He doesn't know what Dr. Benoff is going to do --

MR. STERN: Oh, I do. I do. Because I've had other cases where Dr. Benoff says lawyers are not allowed to have the raw data.

> MR. KESSLER: That's not this --

MR. STERN: -- short of a court -- short of a court order. So he's not giving Mr. Kessler the raw data.

I -- Your Honor, I don't know MR. KESSLER: how you could accept that representation. I mean, there's -- there's no -- you know, there's nothing before the Court that -- that says --

This isn't my first rodeo with MR. STERN: Dr. Benoff.

> I understand that. MR. KESSLER:

THE COURT: And, you know, I -- obviously, I respect Mr. Stern and his representations. He's not going to make that lightly in front of me, you know, so I -- I know there's a basis for him to say that. but I mean, the -- the form of order says raw data, scoring summary sheet, and office notes. So, you know,

Argument

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the raw data, I can understand. The other two items, I'm not sure I understand.

MR. STERN: Well, Dr. Benoff will score the So my client takes the test. That's raw data. So if next week, my client's being tested, as soon as she leaves the office, there's a pile of documents. That's the raw data.

Now, Dr. Benoff then has to score those So he scores them and then he interprets the tests. Oftentimes, Dr. Benoff and other neuropsychologists mis-score the tests, so I need -- and sometimes they'll put in reports, this is a T score, this is a whatever score. But I need to know what his scores are so I can see whether or not he properly scored the test. So that's the scoring sheet. one-page document.

And then I don't know if there are notes or If there are no notes, there are no notes.

How -- how quickly does he score THE COURT: the raw data?

> MR. STERN: Excuse me?

THE COURT: How quickly does -- does the raw data get scored?

I -- that, I don't know. MR. STERN: Sometimes it takes months before I get a report.

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don't know how quickly he actually scores the test or not. That, I don't -- I don't know.

THE COURT: -- 10 days.

MR. STERN: I mean, he can give me the raw data and the scoring sheet when he sends me the report. I just want to -- I just don't want to go months down the road.

THE COURT: Why -- why don't I do this? MR. KESSLER: Judge, I -- THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead.

MR. KESSLER: I just want -- a motion to compel, I mean, an order to compel is just inappropriate at this time. I -- I think it's a nonissue. I think we would be able to handle this. It's just that at this time, it's -- it's inappropriate.

THE COURT: Why -- why don't I do this, and I -- I hate to do this because, you know, I like to get stuff decided when I'm dealing with it, but I'm going to adjourn this to August 15th is -- is a motion day and let this play out. But I -- you know, I -- I understand Mr. Stern's point. I -- I don't want to have him, you know, have to re-do this all again and submit a motion if -- if he's not going to supply this information, but I respect your position, Mr. Kessler, that you kind of need to -- to see this information

Colloquy

before you can produce it.

So I'll just adjourn the motion to August 15th and hopefully it's resolved by then. If it's not, then we'll deal with it at that point and I think well all have more information to make a decision. I -- you know, my -- my two-second editorial is that it seems like Mr. Stern would be entitled to this information, but -- you know, so to the extent, Mr. Kessler, you know, your client is inclined to not produce it, you know -- my initial thoughts, but I think you should have the opportunity to look at it before I order it. Okay? So -- the motion to August 15th. All right?

So we have one more motion, which has a whole bunch of issues in it. So -- so I don't know, you know, I've read the papers. I don't know if you've spoken since, but we need to be very specific with this because the papers were kind of general. So Mr. Stern, we -- we can take one issue at a time.

MR. STERN: I'm going to have Mr. Stanley ma -- argue, Your Honor. I just want to make one introductory comment, and that is in Mr. Meyer's opposition, he says the first time they learned of what I claim their deficiencies were when I filed this motion. That's not accurate.

Just by way of background, on May 30th -- so

Colloquy / Argument

Friday -- late Friday afternoon, Mr. Meyer called me and said I'm going to be sending you the documents -- the -- in -- responsive to the Notice to Produce later this evening. We're going to produce our response, written response, next week, being the week of June 2nd.

He did send me the documents on May 30th, so I was clearly aware of what they were sending me and what they were not sending me. In — the following Monday, I sent Mr. Meyer and Mr. Carton a letter listing the deficiencies. They never responded to that letter. But I did res — advise them of the deficiencies as of June 2nd. But I'll now turn it over to Mr. Stanley, who can address specifically the Notice to Produce.

THE COURT: Okay. And you know what? It might make sense to go each specific issue by issue. Okay? But go ahead, Mr. Stanley.

MR. STANLEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. So the documents that we seek are all kept in the normal course of business by Uber. Some of the documents are triggered through Uber's systems automatically, whether it's by telematics or AI or algorithm. Some of the documents we seek are subject to the customer support representatives who follow these policies and

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procedures to then deal with a driver or deal with a rider or deal with a delivery person on their system.

We are seeking deactivation materials that exist that haven't been produced. We're seeking a trip animation that is always created in the normal course of business by Uber to -- to do an investigation on a collision like this. We're seeking Safety Lens data from Safety Lens. There's a platform, and this is in Request number 25. It's a platform that -- that the driver's account is on that will show different violations of Uber's policies and procedures and also issues of dangerous driving or -- or other altercations that occur on the system.

We're looking for all of the correspondence that would have come into Uber from the driver, and these are called tickets.

THE COURT: I'm sorry to interrupt you. I -- we just need to go through one specific issue at a time.

MR. STANLEY: Perfect. Okay. Thank you. so, first of all, the deactivation materials. What we've received basically is -- is just the communication to the driver saying that he's been deactivated. But there would have been more to the investigation.

And in the response from Uber, what we see is is that this was done at the direction of counsel. Well, when -- when Uber is notified of this wreck, customer support service agents follow the procedure that is required. They pull the GPS, they create the animated map, they use the animated map to see what happened, when -- when the collision might have happened. They then go to a process where they create something called a JIRA. That's J-I-R-A. And that is the final investigative document that decides whether or not this person can stay on the system or not. It also identifies the investigative material, the people who looked at this investigation and -- and decided on the final outcome.

So those documents are not -- have not been produced. They're not in the record. So that's -- that's the first area of documents that we're seeking.

THE COURT: All right. And just so I understand you, the specific documents, they're called deactivation materials?

MR. STANLEY: Well, that is the -- the overarching term, but the specific documents that we're looking for are -- it's the Voyager or Chronicle trip animated map function that takes the GPS material, puts it into their system, and produces a moving car on the

Argument

map that shows speed and when the contact would have happened and what happened on the map. So that's one, the -- the animated map feature.

We're seeking the JIRA, which is the final investigative document that houses and has a summary of -- of all that they did to look at this and when the notice came in and what the outcome was.

And we're also seeking Safety Lens material that would fall under the deactivation of this driver. And Safety Lens is basically a -- page platform, internals that we were -- that has all of this suspension or deactivation data in it. So those are the areas of deactivation that we're seeking, all kept in the normal course, all done when -- when an investigation occurs.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Carton? You're muted.

MR. CARTON: Sorry, Your Honor. I jumped off -- I jumped on the -- argument there. Your Honor, respectfully to counsel, he's not under oath. He's not a fact witness. He's not qualified as -- in any expert capacity here, and he's wrong about most of his certification and the things that -- is saying now. So highly strange, this situation.

This is a motion, Your Honor, about a Notice

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to Produce with 40 specific requests. The motion -- what the motion does not do, and Uber's position is it has fully complied with all demands for documents, including Notice to Produce number 12, and we've given the detailed, yes, objections, but then followed by see this Bates number, see this, already produced.

So everything that is produceable has been produced. What the motion does not do is go through I any organized way and say number one, this is what we need. We've got this general certification from Counsel, which is based upon essentially factual testimony about how Uber works, which is not in any way qualified or proper, and we're just shooting these targets.

I'll try to deal with it the best I can, Your Honor, but I would suggest the way we go off it is Mr. Stern's conclusion to his actual motion for all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter an order com -- and it's on page 45, compelling defendants Uber Technologies to produce all documents, but not individual agreements, and they're listed. At least there's some organization there. But in any event, I'll try to deal with these, Your Honor, in the way that were come up.

The Voyager and Chronicle documents that were

Argument

just referenced, this is the mapping, this is based upon data from GPS and speed. GPS is longitude, latitude, and speed, Your Honor. That is the data that is -- exists that Uber maintains. That's the data has all been produced to the plaintiff long ago in this litigation. They have all of it.

What they're asking for now so they could — they know exactly where Escobar was at any given second. This — this information goes to the second increments, Your Honor. What they're asking for when they say Voyager and Chronicle mapping data, these are internal — they're called data visualization tools. This is what Uber has created through internal proprietary and trade secret tools that Uber has created that it inputs the data that the plaintiffs have here, GPS and speed, so that Uber can visualize that data on a map. This is — and what Uber's position on this is is counsel's not entitled to production in discovery of our tools that we've created to interpret data.

Counsel has the data. Counsel could absolutely go to -- they'll do this for trial, if it was an Uber, go get GPS speed and longitude to a -- lots of places that -- and they'll create you the map you're asking for. But the position of Uber is these

data visualization tools are not produceable discovery, These are proprietary trade secret tools Your Honor. that Uber uses the data. Counsel has all of the data on which those tools Uber uses in the subject of its, you know, defense of these claims. So they've got the They can make -- they can create the maps that they're looking for.

> THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Stanley?

MR. STANLEY: I think what you heard from counsel -- I think what you heard from counsel is that Uber creates this in the normal course of investigation, and that's exactly what I said. exactly what -- what they do. And in -- and it would be the same (indiscernible) car wreck case where a company creates an investigation of what happened, and this is part of the tools that they use to see what happened. They have this material. They do it on every car wreck case and it's -- it's -- it's testimony

> THE COURT: Does it --

MR. STANLEY: -- says -- it says corporate representative and witnesses, that I'm aware of, that I proposed. It says -- on record that they have this material and it's a visualation -- visualization --MR. CARTON: Right. We have a tool that we

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can use, Your Honor.

MR. STANLEY: That is used.

MR. CARTON: It's being represented that we

use it --

MR. STERN: Mr. Carton -- let us finish.

THE COURT: It's one at a time, Mr. Carton.

I'll let Mr. Stanley finish.

MR. CARTON: Okay.

MR. STANLEY: And -- and so you've heard that it is a tool that is used by Uber, and it is. And it's used to investigate in the normal course of business. It's part of their investigation tools that they use to see what happened. And so they have this. It shows more on it than just lat, long, and -- and speed. shows car movements and things like that on an actual map, and it's something that they use in the normal So it's something that is -- it's a business document. It should be produced.

THE COURT: And then can I just ask, I mean, Mr. Carton's point is that you have all the data you need to create this, you know, animated representation.

The -- the platform itself that MR. STANLEY: they use has more information than just speed. it shows -- it shows where things are moving at certain times, how long a car was stopped at certain places,

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where he was going along with that as he went. And so it's already there and it's one of the main tools they use to investigate. And so if we put it into a GPS tool, then it's not going to be the same as what Uber has and uses and it's not going to be what they created to investigate this wreck specifically.

THE COURT: Mr. Carton?

MR. CARTON: Yeah. Your Honor, this is entirely improper. This counsel's offering testimony about what Uber does and he started by trying to say we do it always in every single accident case, and he's now backed off to it's a tool we have available for investigation. This is a proprietary tool that Uber can use, Your Honor, and it's created itself.

Your Honor's exactly right. They have the data. They can create a map that shows the car moving and when it stops, longitude and latitude, and the speed goes to zero, the map will show it stopped. They can create everything in these tools, Your Honor. It is not subject to production. It is not documents kept in the ordinary course of business. These are litigation -- these are tools created. They're proprietary. They are a trade secret that can be used by the client and plaintiff's client has no basis to them, Your Honor, unless maybe they could say that they

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actually couldn't produce their own map, which they absolutely could do.

MR. STERN: So now, Mr. Carton, who's testifying? Your Honor, Uber has not produced one certification or affidavit from anyone from Uber supporting what Mr. Carton is saying. Mr. Stanley said based on my experience with Uber, they create this. We know they have this program. Do we have any affidavits from Uber saying we didn't do it in this case? No. We don't. We only have Mr. Carton and Mr. Meyer objecting.

If I can, Your Honor, other things that are missing that we requested. We were provided with background checks that showed in 2017 into 18, there was a customer complaint by a rider about Mr. Escobar. As a result of that complaint, Mr. Escobar's driving privileges for Uber were suspended.

In 2019, Mr. Escobar applied -- reapplied to become an Uber driver. He was rejected, according to Uber's documents. There would be and ought to be various texts, emails, or the like between Uber and Mr. Escobar. In fact, Your Honor, I believe it's exhibit J, which is at the end of our brief. There are summaries of all the emails and texts that were sent to Mr. Escobar by Uber. We've requested those. They

haven't been supplied, just the summary.

And when you look at the summary, Your Honor, some of it's in Spanish and we can clearly have that translated. Some of it looks like there's a colloquy (indiscernible). I can't make out what it is, but those are just summaries and we want the actual texts and emails. And Mr. Carton can't say they don't exist because interestingly, they provided us with the initial complaint that was made in 2017. So they have the complaint but they haven't given us any of the other documents with regard to Mr. Escobar, and that's all covered under driving screening that we requested.

We're not provided with any communications between Uber and Checker, other than just we have the background cer -- thing. We know that Mr. Escobar was involved in multiple motor vehicle accidents prior to this one in 2022. If there are documents with regard to Uber go and get those police reports to see whether Mr. Escobar was at fault or whether the other driver was at fault, they might have all those documents. Again, none of it was supplied and Uber did not attach a certification saying they didn't have that.

As we move to driver history, they've given us a complete driver log $-\!-$

THE COURT: (Indiscernible.)

Argument

MR. STANLEY: And -- and Judge, can I -- getting this from Uber, what they create in the normal course, also shows they're monitoring, oversight of the driver. I know that also, these -- these maps will show what state or status that the driver is in, whether it's period one, two, or three. Period one is when he's waiting on a trip to be given to him by Uber. And so it shows oversight as well.

And so it goes to the oversight, it goes to control, it goes to the investigative material. And again, no one's said that they don't have it. No one's said that it wasn't created in this case, and I believe it is -- normally is, in the normal course, and they have it and it should be produced.

THE COURT: Okay. Let -- let's just go back to the -- the -- what was called the deactivation materials, the animated wreck, the JIRA, the Safety Lens material. So Mr. Carton, I'm just going to ask that, you know, you have your client produce a certification, you know, confirming or not what you represented, and that would be provided to the plaintiff in this case.

I'm just trying to understand, too, and the certification from your client could clarify. It -- it sounds like you're saying that all of the factual

information necessary has been provided and that the underlying software or whatever isn't -- doesn't have any relevance to, you know, moving the ball in one I'm not sure what the trade direction or another. secret has to do with it. If it's not relevant, I don't really need to get to the issue of trade secret.

So, I was just a little confused about that. But I think the first step is, and I agree with -- with Mr. Stern; I was writing that down before he even said it, that I think we need a certification from you on that, from your client. Do you understand?

MR. CARTON: I understand, Your Honor and Your Honor is correct and -- and I -- I will make sure -- I believe I understand what you're looking for. -- all the data has been produced -- GPS and speed. What has also been produced when Mr. Stanley talks about the trip stopping or whether he's on or off, the -- all -- the entire flow history for Escobar, so -has been produced, from 2017 to -- to the time -- the day of this accident. Literally, the driver, the status, status note, begin trip status time, end trip status time, for every single trip he has ever taken driving for -- on the Uber app.

They have all data for every single trip In other words, I'm talking Escobar has ever taken.

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about when he's the driver, the time the offer comes in, meaning the person on the app requesting him, whether he accepts, begin trip time, drop time. But I -- I of that data is -- has all been produced. believe -- I understand on the -- the certification, Your Honor.

And the reason I mention it's a proprietary trade secret is it's a tool we made, and if we produce it and are ordered to produce it, it could be recreated, it could be re-engineered, reverse engineered to see what we have. It's a proprietary tool, Your Honor.

So, I understand about the certification and I'll -- I'll be happy to get that, to flesh that out because Your Honor's correct. All of the data underlying everything in that tool, plaintiffs have. They just want it -- the work of making that map done for themselves.

Judge, that's not -- that's not MR. STANLEY: And this material has been ordered to be what we want. produced in other cases as well. This is not novel. What we want is we want Uber's investigative material and that's what this is, created in the normal course of business to look and see what happens.

And this has been ordered in other cases that

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I've been involved in. It's not novel. The proprietary interest is -- is not something that we're going to go spread to the world. We want it for this case specifically. And it should be produced because it's created in the normal course of business. It goes to their investigation and it's not something that's brand new (indiscernible) outside of this litigation that no one's ever gotten to be produced. -- fight it every time, but it's been ordered many times to be produced.

THE COURT: You say investigative materials, that -- that sounds like factual information to me.

MR. STANLEY: It -- it is. It is, Your Honor. What they do is they -- they take this map, they look at it to see what happens. The customer support reps look at it to see whether or not it goes into the calculus of deactivating the driver. And so it's part of what they look at to decide whether or not this driver in this position should be deactivated.

MR. CARTON: There's no evidence it was done here, Your Honor. I'll -- I'll confirm that. And when we talk about investigation, Your Honor, many of these requests, I'm sure we'll get to it, the -- the investigation in this case, this accident came to light through Bruce -- counsel's -- Mr. Stern's letter of

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representation, which was immediately sent to an inhouse counsel, which was immediately sent to me. That's the investigation. So whether or not these — these customer service reps applied this is absolutely not of — of the record that that was done here in this case at all.

So we'll -- I think I understand what the certification Your Honor's looking for, and we can shed some light on this.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STANLEY: Judge, I hate to prolong this. Can you tell us what certification you have in mind for this, just so we're all clear what -- what Uber is to include in the certification?

THE COURT: I -- I thought I was clear, but you had asked for the -- as I said, the animated map, the JIRA, the Safety Lens material. And Mr. Carton's point is that you produced all the factual data related to those requests. So -- but I need a certification from a professional in his office to confirm that or not, and to also confirm or not whether there was an investigation done. And if one wasn't done, and if one was done, then that should be, you know, whatever facts came out of that would have to be produced.

MR. STANLEY: Thank you, Judge.

MR. STERN: Your Honor, going back to driver screening, because you asked to go -- asked us to go through this. I know it's item by item, but I want to make clear, we've requested all the specific emails, text messages that were sent by Uber to Mr. Escobar. They've given us a summary so we know every date that something occurred, but we don't have the actual emails, we don't have the actual texts.

As I said, Your Honor, we know that Mr. Escobar was suspended before this accident. We know that he was denied access, he was -- his application was rejected in 2019. Presumably, there would be some type of communication between Uber and Mr. Escobar. We requested that. That's never been produced.

MR. CARTON: May I address that, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. CARTON: Your Honor, it's been produced. Every single communication that Uber has ever had with Mr. Escobar has been produced. There's 300 pages of all -- every message. What counsel is calling a summary is not. It is the only textual representation of what remains of what messages were sent to Escobar. It's kept in that -- in the ordinary course of business in that fashion because all these -- this data, Your Honor, that is shot to an application that the driver

Argument

sees on the phone. There's no way to recreate the form that it's received by the driver. To -- it's not possible to do a screen-shot rebuild of what Escobar saw.

What counsel has is not a summary. Counsel has -- it's just in a text -- in a -- it's -- it comes out like a table that says -- it says the -- what was done, when, and the -- the substance of the full communication is given, whether it was in Spanish or English. So we have nothing else, Your Honor. It's not a summary. Every communication that Uber has ever had with Escobar has been produced, in the only form that it exists. And we've said that in our Notice to Produce responses and it's just being misrepresented that it's somehow or another, there's something else that exists. There is not.

MR. STERN: Again, no certification submitted by Uber, just Mr. Carton's testimony here today.

MR. CARTON: Your Honor, what are we certifying to? This motion did not attack a single discovery response of Uber. It doesn't say 25 is insufficient, or 32, or 42. We've got this broad-based — if you look at five different places, it'll say five different things that aren't produced. If we go to the conclusion of the motion of what was asked for, what

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this motion is supposedly about, it's individual agreements and -- records for Juan Escobar. This is what was asked to be produced. Internal adjudication criteria, driver reactivation policies (indiscernible) performance. So --

MR. STERN: Just by example, Your Honor, if you go to page 623 of our motion, 623 of 698, just by way, as I say, of su -- as an example, where it says, "Content". This was on December 7th of 2021. Content: no one can even read what that content is.

MR. CARTON: Your Honor, there is some — there are some symbols that appear in the production because of the conversion from the way it's sent on the app and — way it's maintained. You can still read it. It's either in Spanish or in English.

The fact of the matter is every communication has been produced. There's no certification in this motion, Your Honor, because what were you supposed to do, read paragraph for paragraph Mr. Stanley's certification of what he claims we do? There's no — the motion should say Notice to Produce number 1, this is what is not here. Number two, this is not workable. And if we're going to sit here and go through and — and I'm going to be accused of not having a certification that I didn't need, a generalized

Argument

certification that didn't point to as a single demand as being insufficient but instead, general categories, it's just not going to work.

MR. STERN: Because you don't want it to work.

MR. CARTON: No. Your Honor, may I just state for the record what we have produced, Your Honor, just so Your Honor gets an idea of, and maybe we could say what's left.

MR. STERN: I agree.

MR. CARTON: We dispute everything --

everything --

MR. STERN: (Indiscernible.)

MR. CARTON: -- our --

MR. STERN: -- attached to our brief the

documents you --

MR. CARTON: No. But I -- I'd like the Court to understand the scope of what's been produced. Your Honor, we've produced everything that Escobar submitted to get on the application. So his driver's license, insurance, everything that he submitted, they have. Every single background check. They misrepresent and say these are summaries? They have the full background checks. They're not summaries.

They fault us and say we don't have any

communications with Checker? We don't have any communications with Checker. It's a third party that performed a background check and gave it to them. don't have. So they've got the background checks.

They have all speed and GPS data from the -the date of the accident, by the second. Every communication Uber has ever sent to Escobar, they have. All audio calls to customer service that -- with Escobar regarding this accident, they have. They've got tape recordings of them. All communications regarding the one complaint that Escobar ever received, this is the Bliss -- this is called a Bliss tool. They have it. It's 100 percent of -- of customer support communications are Bliss, and that was provided. was -- the one complaint that a customer registered, and Uber's communication to Escobar about it. They have -- they have that. They have all that for every trip he's ever taken since 2017.

MR. STERN: We do not -- we do not have what was sent to Mr. Escobar with regard to the re -- the complaint. We only have what the complaint.

MR. CARTON: Whatever the Bliss report was where I believe, Bruce, I saw it today, it says Dear Mr. Escobar, we've received the attached complaint from somebody in your vehicle, et cetera. You have that.

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You got the complaint that came in, forwarded. got the average rating data for the dating question and all time for this driver -- every single agreement Escobar has ever agreed to with time stamp, Your Honor. Sixteen agreements in total. Every single time he had to go on the app and accept an agreement, they have it and it's time-stamped. And we're being told in these papers and hundreds of pages, they don't. though. I don't know what else to say. And --

(Indiscernible.) MR. STERN: MR. CARTON: -- quidelines.

workable, Your Honor, to try to just say that we --Uber has failed to comply, but not to point to a single Notice to Produce response and put --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STERN: Your Honor, they -- we asked them for the policies with regard to when they deactivate or suspend a rider (sic). We've never been supplied by that (sic). As I've said, we know that Mr. Escobar was We know he was rejected once. suspended once. don't -- we've asked for those policies --

THE COURT: Sorry? Is there a policy on deactivation?

MR. CARTON: The -- they have everything about his history and I -- if I can -- if counsel would

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point to what request that is specifically, I'd like to look at their response, Your Honor, because I believe they've got that as well.

MR. STERN: We don't have any Uber policies

MR. CARTON: Well, Your Honor, the way that these policies in this motion appear are knowledgebased documents. And what Mr. Stern did is he attached as exhibit A to his motion a spreadsheet with 856 alleged policies. They -- they have weird -- not full names, no description, that Mr. Stanley I don't -- I don't think had committed to memory, so he obtained that information from the MDL, on which he's the steering committee, and of that 856, 200 of them I believe are policies. Every single one of those is a policy that is utilized by Uber customer support for -to counsel victims of alleged sexual assault.

MR. STANLEY: Absolutely not true. absolutely not true. And so what I -- here, Judge --MR. CARTON: It is true.

MR. STANLEY: No, it's not true, at all. haven't looked at it. You haven't talked to these witnesses. You don't know what you're talking about in this situation.

MR. CARTON: Well --

Argument

MR. STANLEY: and I'll --MR. CARTON: -- know what that document is, either.

(Parties all speaking over one another.) THE COURT: -- at a time. Okay? So the question on the table was is there a deactivation policy and if so, what request is it to Mr. Carton?

> MR. CARTON: Yeah. What request?

THE COURT: And, you know, by the way, I've asked that when you submit motion papers, that you send courtesy copies and -- and I don't really get them in these cases, so I need you to do that in the future. Okay?

> MR. STERN: We will, Your Honor. All right, Your Honor. MR. CARTON:

MR. STANLEY: The activation materials are captured in the knowledge-based request. And so there are many different deactivation materials and policies that are followed by customer support reps on how to and when to deactivate drivers. They're located in those requests. And so the -- Uber knows what those are and no, they're not all pertaining to the sexual assault litigation, they're pertaining to customer service reps and what they're told to do, and how they're told to do it. And there's thousands and

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thousands of these articles and policies that instruct customer -- customer service representatives on how to deal with a problem that comes in.

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All of these go to Uber's control and (indiscernible) Uber has behind the backs of these drivers and the strings that they pull and how they pull them. And so there are policies all through about deactivation on that. DACT, D-A-C-T, is a specific category of policies that instruct when, how, and -and how to inform drivers of deactivation.

And so the -- to say that all these are subject to the sexual assault litigation is -- is wrong. Many of these were borne out of prior litigations that I've had before that. Right? it's known that these exist and they are used internally for people to -- to move drivers through the system. If it's a request, if it's a violation of the rules, if it's some rider saying that a driver did something wrong, all of those on the knowledge-based platform are -- are constructed to what to do in those situations.

THE COURT: Mr. Carton?

MR. CARTON: Your Honor, what -- the Notice to Produce number 30: produce all knowledge-based articles, documents, and policies identified in Exhibit

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Exhibit A is the document I've A attached hereto. referenced, 864 things, let's just say, of which apparently, according to Mr. Stanley, in there are contained policies. I don't believe all 856 claims are policies, but policies. And my -- my -- the response from Uber to that was that the -- I'm sorry. The -those policies all relate to customer service. They're all available to customer service representatives from Uber to counsel sexual assault victims in sexual -allegations of sexual assault cases, not motor vehicle accidents, not accidents where, such as this, Mr. Escobar is driving without even a passenger and having not even been summoned by a passenger of Uber. not applicable, Your Honor.

And so, you know, it's stated on here, this is my point, oh, it's -- as if it was so simple, Mr. Carton hasn't produced activation documents -policies. Well, the request is to produce 854 in exhibit a, Your Honor, and -- and we've represented those are not related to motor vehicle, so --

MR. STANLEY: That's false.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STANLEY: That is false.

THE COURT: Let me just ask. I mean, is -is there a specific policy or a general policy on how a

driver gets deactivated? 2 MR. CARTON: 3

I would ask counsel on the 864

MR. STERN: Just for their number eight, my request on number 8 was every set of background check adjudication criteria. We wanted to know is what's Uber's policy, this is just with regard to number eight, specifically with regard to the background check adjudication criteria when --

MR. CARTON: Yes.

MR. STERN: -- in 2019, they rejected him. In 2022, they accepted him. So one of the claims here is why in 2022 did you accept somebody to drive to take people from point A to point B when you knew they were an unsafe driver and you had rejected them in 2019? Now, we'll get to venture why that happened, but there must have been some criteria or policy that Uber utilizes to determine why are they going to permit somebody to be a driver or not permit somebody?

We know they suspended Mr. Escobar. What's the policy or criteria they used to do that? There are documents for that. That's just one small subset of our request.

MR. CARTON: Okay. But --

MR. STERN: But, you know, you're taking Mr.

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-- you're not. Mr. Carton's saying well, believe me, these are all sexual assault. I don't know that he's ever even seen the 800 documents. Mr. Stanley certainly has seen them.

(Multiple parties speaking at once.) THE COURT: I mean, I understand why you have to reference a specific, you know, knowledge-based number. I mean, Mr. Stern just said do you have any criteria or policies in writing with respect to deactivation or reactivation?

MR. CARTON: Yeah.
MR. STANLEY: And Judge, this is the problem. When -- when policies are asked for generally, this is the response. And then when policies are asked for specifically, they don't even look at them or they mischaracterize what they are. And so that's why the -- the list was provided, so that the specific -specific real documents that are in the system will be produced that go to control and also go to investigation, go to deactivation, go to all these other issues that -- they go to vicarious liability and Uber's negligence in this matter.

And so -- so if we ask for them specifically, they don't produce them. If we ask for them generally, they don't produce them. And so they are -- they are

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very important to all of those issues in this case.

THE COURT: Mm-hmm. Mr. Carton, do you want to address it?

MR. CARTON: Your Honor, the acti -adjudication criteria in New Jersey that Uber complies
mirror -- this is to onboard somebody or to allow them
access to the app, are -- they mirror completely the
statutory regulations contained in the N.J.S.A. 39:5H1, which is the -- the T&C regulations in New Jersey.
In other words, to be a T&C driver in New Jersey under
the statute that I referenced, there are certain things
that a driver, if you meet them, you're adjudicated to
be qualified to drive.

Uber follows that. So that has been the representation of Uber. We've done it in responses and -- first. There is no separate adjudication criteria that is applied to Mr. Escobar in New Jersey. If a state doesn't have a statute equivalent to a T&C statute that would provide criteria, then Uber has adjudication criteria. But in this case, it's completely duplicative of the New Jersey statute. That is the criteria that allows him either to be on or off the app. And -- and there -- so there is no criteria to produce for adjudication criteria for New Jersey. I can see why counsel, especially Mr.

Argument

Stanley, would want the adjudication criteria for other states. It's becoming pretty obviously, I think. But very much so not why they -- be produced in this case, Your Honor. The adjudication criteria are statutory. Uber does not have them for New Jersey.

MR. STERN: Your Honor, Mr. Carton makes this misrepresentation that this all has to do with the sexual assault, but when you go to exhibit A, I'm just looking at one page. I'm just looking at number 343 through 375, they all have to do with safety. Safety on -- not allowed to use -- not allowed to have anybody in your car, not allowed to use a different car. There's all kinds of criteria in here which dem -- will demonstrate Uber's control over its drivers. I mean, you just have to look at the names --

MR. STANLEY: Line -- line 791 houses the United States background check homepage, which has all kinds of different policies about back -- background checks and how to adjudicate them, when they expire, what they do when they get the documents in from a background check, how they send messages out to drivers. So all -- all of this is -- is -- there's so much information about how Uber takes these drivers on every step of the way, how they respond to drivers and how they are to respond to what drivers say to them.

And if a driver says that I'm owed more money or owed less money or the payment structure or the earning capacity, all of those things are in these policies.

> MR. STERN: You know --

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MR. CARTON: None of which happened with respect to Mr. Escobar.

MR. STERN: It doesn't matter whether -- it's not whether it applies to -- it applies to him whether they exercised it or not. If they have the right to it under New Jersey law, if they have the right to control him, that's all that has to be shown. But I'm talking about the misrepresentation you're making, Mr. Carton, to the Court when you say this all has to do with sexual assault.

MR. CARTON: It's not a misrepresentation. MR. STERN: Look at 272 to 280, account Vehicle crash claims. inactive repository. nothing to do with sexual assault. So for you to say -- but the bottom line, Your Honor, is this is discovery. They produce the documents to us. If some of them don't apply, they won't apply. But to say you can't have them because we don't think they apply isn't what our discovery rules are. Discovery rules in New Jersey are liberal. They should produce it. And then what ultimately is admissible at trial is admissible.

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But what -- why don't you want to -- why can't they produce it? We still haven't had a reason. Why can't you just --

> MR. CARTON: -- Your Honor --

(Multiple parties speaking at once.)

MR. CARTON: It was produced in the MDL in which that's where this information came from. our papers, Your Honor. Your Honor has the letters. Cease and desist letters have been issued and the --

MR. STANLEY: He doesn't have my letter. He doesn't have my letter.

THE COURT: I'm not worried about --

(Indiscernible.) MR. STERN:

THE COURT: I'm not worried about other litigation, so let's focus on this case. Mr. Carton, go ahead.

MR. CARTON: Thank you. The -- so, of the knowledge-based articles, Your Honor, of -- the only ones of the 856, all 856 are not policies. There's all kinds of things listed here. The policies at issue of which somewhere along the way, they say they only want 200, even though -- that's what they say in their papers even though there's 856 on here and they clearly requested them all. The policies that are on that document relate to sexual assault claims. They're not

relevant to motor vehicle accidents.

Absolutely incorrect. MR. STANLEY:

THE COURT: Well, I mean, Mr. Carton, can't somebody from HR -- I mean -- I mean, I -- you know, I respect what you say, but it seems like there's a dispute here, based upon the names of these policies or -- or documents.

MR. STANLEY: (Indiscernible) driver safety across the -- law enforcement radio -- legal crash claims, driver preferences, such as destination. of those are controls that Uber has over these drivers and the way that drivers can use the app. I've taken the deposition of Matthew Baker in this matter on these policies before, outside of MDL before I even got into MDL. And so he's the corporate rep -- over these policies. (Indiscernible.) He talks about it on the record. I --

THE COURT: -- certification, Mr. Carton, sent to plaintiff's counsel that if it's your position there's -- or corporate's position that these are all sexual assault documents, put it in a certification. If not, and they have some bearing on control, or the right to control, as Mr. Stern correctly says, they should be produced. It's not that complicated. not -- not sure -- does that make sense?

Colloquy

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MR. CARTON: I believe so, Your Honor. Okay. What else do we need to THE COURT: address?

I think that covers most of it. MR. STERN: Other than my requested extension of discovery.

That's fine. Let me just THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I'm open to whatever you find your order here. all want to do. So, that -- I mean, I see the dates you put in here. Those are fine with me if they're fine with -- Mr. Carton, are you okay with them?

> MR. CARTON: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. STANLEY: Judge, could I ask one more request on the communications? So the communication log has been produced. But could we get a certification from Uber that all Bliss communications have been produced?

THE COURT: What's that?

MR. STANLEY: A Bliss communication is a text communication that comes into the app from a rider or from a driver or about a rider and a driver by customer service reps. There's been 400 trips that this driver performed on the platform. There have been three or four Bliss communications that have been produced. Historically, Uber can produce and has produced Bliss communications from a driver and about a driver, or

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Colloguy / Decision

from a rider about a driver. And oftentimes, those communications have customer support reps that are talking about what to do in certain situations. And so that's different than a communication log that's 300 A lot of that deals with marketing efforts that pages. are sent to the driver.

And so I would like -- I would normally see in these cases far more Bliss communications. And so a certification from Uber that all Bliss communications about the rider, to the rider -- about the driver, sorry, to the driver, or from the rider about the driver have been produced, because they're really important to the control element.

THE COURT: Mr. Carton, any objection? MR. CARTON: My understanding is all Bliss communications have been provided, Your Honor, but if Your Honor wants a certification saying that, that's fine.

> THE COURT: Yeah. I'd ask for that. MR. STANLEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So, you know, the order --I'm just going to say the motion is granted in part, denied in part for the reasons stated on the record. -- I think we've addressed everything here. You know, this conversation's on the record, obviously.

Argument

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I'll -- I'll enter the -- the discovery extension. Anything else?

MR. STERN: No, Your Honor.

MR. CARTON: Your Honor, the -- we did have a cross-motion, and I would renew it. We made the argument before. I think this case, especially with a 120-day extension, is just getting started. unfortunately, it really needs to be managed. We shouldn't be here on Friday with these types of motions, Your Honor, and counsel's going to say (indiscernible). It's not. I have -- at the end of the day, I think that there just -- it needs to be managed and I think it -- it is absolutely within the Court's power to appoint a Special Master. It doesn't have to be at the request of the parties. It can be put in place by the Court.

And in this -- for -- for example, Your Honor, what happened here, this Notice to Produce with a lousy 40 things on it would have been in front of a Special Master for him or her to deal with and say okay, produce this, this, make a recommendation, Your Honor -- sign off and we don't have to spend all of the Court's time. I think at this point, we need a protective order in place and we -- I would renew and it is a formal motion that we made here, my request

Argument / Decision

that a Special Master be appointed to govern these -these disputes. They don't seem like they're getting less, Your Honor.

MR. STERN: Well, Your Honor -- Your Honor denied this and Your Honor should deny this request again. Once Mr. Carton and Uber comply with our requests for -- to compel these documents, we're ready to take depositions. I don't have any more documents to request. Everything we've needed is -- we've That's not to say if we take a deposition requested. of a corporate rep or a deposition of Mr. Baker or one of the other -- two of the other four people, that other documents may not suggest that we need, but I don't have any more Notices to Produce, so I don't think there's anything to manage. And we took two hours today and we, you know, went through these motions. I don't know what a Special Master's going to do.

THE COURT: I'm going to deny the request, Mr. Carton. I mean, you know, the Court can take a look at this as the case goes on and -- and, you know, I can reconsider that issue if -- if we're here every other Friday because I do have 1500 other cases on my docket, so I don't have the time to spend a couple hours every couple of weeks. So I -- I know you all

Colloquy

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know that and will do your best to resolve these matters on your own. But I think I can handle it as of Okay? Anything else?

MR. CARTON: No, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Yup. Have a good day.

care.

MR. CARTON: You, too. MR. STANLEY: Take care. MR. STERN: Bye-bye.

(Proceedings concluded at 4:46 p.m.)

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CERTIFICATION

I, SARAH L. FETZ, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CourtSmart, Index No. from 3:06:59 to 4:46:05, is prepared to the best of my ability and in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate compressed transcript of the proceedings, as recorded.

/s/ Sarah L.	Fetz	AD/T 626
Sarah L.	Fetz	AOC Number

KLJ Transcription Service 07/18/2025
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